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The publication of Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) blueprint for a discursive 
social psychology was a pivotal moment in the discursive turn in psychology. 
That transformational text went on to underpin much contemporary discursive 
psychology; paving the way for what has become an enriching range of 
analytic approaches, and epistemological and ontological arguments 
(Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001a; 2001b). Twenty years on, and as 
discursive psychology continues to develop, the approaches it encompasses are 
becoming more vibrantly contested and a range of positions are forming 
around what one might appropriately designate a discursive psychology, and 
what form that discursive psychology should take (Wetherell, forthcoming, 
2007). 
 In this exploratory paper I pursue some of these debates insofar as they 
offer analytic resources for my PhD study of women’s accounts of success and 
failure. I outline two different strands in discursive psychology; an 
epistemological constructionism concerned with how meaning is established in 
interaction; and an ontological constructionism, which takes this somewhat 
further by looking at the implications of constructions for subjects and 
subjectivity. I consider a range of resources available for a discursive 
psychology attentive to the everyday practices of lived lives, to the 
intersubjective production of meanings and to the theorisation of individual 
history and individual differences. As part of this, I explore the potential 
contribution of a psycho-social discursive psychology, significant for the 
inextricable connection it makes between individual and society, and for how it 
might inform notions of a dynamic, acting, individual. In this, however, I query 
whether a discursive psycho-social psychology must necessarily draw upon 
traditional psychoanalytic architectures. 
 
 





The Empirical Challenge 
 
The empirical grounding for the work lies in women’s talk of success and 
failure, of being, or not being, ‘good-enough’. It is concerned with the 
intersubjective and reflexive performance and understanding the Self and 
Other. It explores a subject and a subjectivity loaded with values and moral 
orders. It explores the discursive positions privileged and the moral orders 
invoked. Because it assumes that these moral orders entail practices of power, 
practices which constrain and regulate behaviour, it takes a critical reading of 
the topic (Henriques, Hollway, Unwin, Venn and Walkerdine, 1984; Skeggs, 
1997; Van Dijk, 1993). 
 The following extract is illustrative of the topic.  It is presented here to 
show some of the rich puzzles of subject and subjectivity for which this study 
is seeking insights; and some of the challenges that analysis will be tackling. 
This fragment comes from an interview with Louisa, who works in child 
protection. She has been describing a case where she was successfully involved 
in removing a child from prostitution. During the case her own life had been 
threatened on more than one occasion. Louisa went to see her doctor to ask for 
sleeping pills. 
 
Louisa: [The doctor said] I’m not giving you sleeping pills I am signing you off 
and all that. Oh-oh, the time of year it was, it was not long before 
Christmas and he said I am signing you off and he signed me off for 
five weeks, and I have never ever in my entire working life had more 
than two weeks off sick, ever, you know so that is the thing about do 
you equate with coping and I said ooh I’ve got work and he said we’ve 
never given you a sick note here I think. Anyway I said oh no I’ve too 
much and he said look, if you have two weeks, you’ll come back just 
before Christmas which, I know what will happen, they’ll immediately 
put you on a duty rota because everybody has Christmas off or people 
phone in sick. So I know in fact, so it’s an issue that I really struggled, 
I thought an abject failure being off sick at that time. 
Jean: Really? 
Louisa: Yes, I absolutely really, I just thought it was my, initially, I thought I 
can’t go off sick. It’s bloody stupid. It’s not as if you have got a broken 
leg and you are off ice skating, you’re being signed off sick as a direct 
result of the sort of work that you’re doing y’know. He was right. The 
battle was I told my manager five weeks, he wanted me to go back and 
review it with him and I said no five weeks it is, so we will have it. So 
five weeks sickness. But I think that I had to adjust to it, in the end, but 
that was an abject failure for me being off that time, it really was. 
Jean: Do you still now? 
Louisa: Yes, it’s still an issue for me. 
Jean: How long ago was this? 
Louisa: About three years back. 






First, why does this need a discursive psychology as a framework for 
investigation and analysis? The study begins with the premise that post-
structuralist theories of language and meaning making provide an important 
means of understanding human behaviour (Hall, 1997). Both micro and macro 
discursive formations of language construct lived lives, lived worlds 
(Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001a). The ‘success and failure’ project is 
concerned with subjectification, and with subjectivity; with what is done, with 
what is accomplished in talk. That crucial notion, language as situated social 
action, is a fundamental principle of discursive psychology (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992) and a fundamental issue for this 
project examining women’s stories. It aims to show some of the discourses 
available, the subject positions constructed in those discourses, and the 
conflicts and tensions in those discourses and through this offer some empirical 
and theoretical illumination of subjectivities and experiences. 
 The conversation with Louisa then, is going to be analysed via a discursive 
psychology. This means it privileges the intrinsic importance of language as 
the primary system of human meaning making. It is attentive to function in 
language, to its action. It is concerned with the interpretative repertoires which 
construct and frame meaning. It is concerned with positioning in talk, both in 
terms of the possible subject spaces made available, and in the placing of 
selves and others in those discursive spaces. It is concerned with 
intersubjectivity, the negotiation of meaning in interaction. It attends to the 
social order in language-in-use. In short, it is concerned with how language is 
used, with the ethno methods of lived lives, with the business that is done in 
language-in-use. 
 However, within discursive psychology  interests have carved out quite 
different lines (Wetherell, 1998; forthcoming, 2007; Wetherell, Taylor and 
Yates, 2001a; 2001b), and has created a range of analytic options. One broad 
stream draws on conversation analysis (see Schegloff, 1999a; 1999b) and in 
psychology is developed in the work of Edwards and Potter, for example 
(Edwards and Potter, 1993; Edwards, 1997; 2006). Here, discursive 
psychology is presented as a theory of language, rather than a theory of 
everything psychological. It is epistemological constructionism, concerned 
with how people do things, with the business of social action, with how people 
manage accusations, justifications, stake, and so on; with how meaning-making 
is practised in interaction. By way of example then, in the extract above one 
feature of interest might be the work done by the interviewer’s ‘Really?’. 
Analysis can explore what this particular utterance in this particular place gives 
rise to; in this instance it appears to elicit elaboration, for example. Analysis 
would of course show much more. This approach focuses on the text, and the 
turn-taking. It is agnostic as to inner processes, and to experience. Some might 





argue therefore, that it is agnostic to the ‘essence’ of psychology and question 
to what extent this conversation analysis version of discursive psychology, 
informative and productive as it certainly can be, is actually a ‘psychology’ at 
all. 
 A second and quite different approach takes up an ontological 
constructionism.  This also takes up the study of language-in-use, but concerns 
itself with both micro and macro discursive formations (see Wetherell, 1998 
and 2005a on the synthesis of micro and macro discourse). In this approach, 
the extract given above is understood to be embedded in a longer, broader body 
of discourse, extending beyond the interview and situated in a lived-life 
history. It aims to say something more about lived lives, about how minds are 
formed, about how ‘the internal’ works, how, and why certain patterns repeat; 
about what objects are constructed and constituted in language practices. It is 
illustrated in a broad range of work (see for example Billig, 1999a; 1999b; 
1999c; Gergen, 1999; Wetherell, 1998; 2003; Wetherell and Edley, 1999). This 
is the approach that I am borrowing from in my own study of women’s 
accounts of success and failure: an ontological constructionism. It draws on 
Bakhtinian arguments of internalised heteroglossia, the multiplicity of voices 
which pre-exist us, into which we are inserted and through which thinking is 
not simply shaped, but is made possible (Billig, 1996; Maybin, 2001; Morson 
and Emerson, 1990). 
 The reason for favouring this choice comes out of a recognition of some of 
the key critiques of discursive psychology: how does it account for individual 
differences, the take up of one discourse rather than another, or contradictions 
in those discourses; how does it take into account personal history and how 
does it make space for experience, how might it explain emotions such as fear, 
or commitments, and so on (see for example, Frosh, 1999)? How does it 
explain Louisa’s rich talk above, the privileging of this particular story, the 
taking on of ‘failure’, presented now as atypical but still significant three years 
on. In effect, this critique suggests that in the process of incorporating a 
recognition of language as situated, versioned, social activity; in making 
language the ‘unit of analysis’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992), discursive 
psychology loses sight of the person, would lose sight of Louisa. 
 Let me expand this critique slightly, in order to draw out some possible 
ways of addressing it. One argument suggests that a resolutely discursive 
approach simply cannot address this problem of the personal; that a resolutely 
discursive route over-privileges the external, the social, in its theorisation of 
the subject. Hollway takes this line for example (Hollway and Jefferson, 2005). 
Hollway argues that to understand why a particular person produces some 
particular talk rather than some other, one must look to people’s dynamic 
defensive investment in accounts (Hollway, 1984). Her solution is to take a 
psychoanalytically informed route into a combined psycho-social account 
(Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). There are other positions of course, but this 




psychoanalytically informed psycho-social account is of particular interest to 
the study of women’s accounts of success, failure, of being or not being good-
enough, for two reasons. The first is that psychoanalytically informed analysis 
is one of the areas in psychology which has much to say about talk of success 
and failure, and what it means for the speaking subject (see for example 
Pappenheim’s (2006) introduction to a special issue on ‘fear of success’). The 
second, is that notions of what is necessarily implied, or might be implied in a 
psycho-social combination are central to much of what this study will go on to 
explore. First, though, a brief exploration of what is captured in Hollway’s 
position. 
 This is a psychoanalytic theorisation of the person which is attuned to 
make space for subjectivity, for experience, for life history and for individual 
investments in particular discourses and subject positions (Hollway, 1984). 
But, it is also a psychoanalytic account which concerns itself with unconscious 
dynamics, with internal worlds, hidden motivations, with dynamically and 
systematically distorted internal representations of the external social world. 
 So, while this account takes the individual seriously, takes subjectivity and 
experience seriously, it has other challenges to address. For example, a critique 
from a discursive approach would argue that its analyses are guilty of over-
interpretation, of going beyond the text; and it is criticised for not adequately 
explaining the form and formation of the internal upon which its interpretations 
rely; it is accused of over-privileging the psyche, failing to take full account of 
the social in its claim to a psycho-social account, of essentialising the subject, 
and overlooking or downplaying multiplicities in identity, in subjectivity, in 
discursive selection (Hollway and Jefferson, 2005; Spears 2005, Wetherell, 
2005a; 2005b). 
 In contrast, discursive psychology has always been alert to the problem of 
the discursive selection: why this utterance here? (Wetherell, 1998). This is 
typified in its attention to functionality, to the social business accomplished in 
talk. Indeed, multiplicity of identity, that quality of being in the world whereby 
we are not consistent and fixed across all situations, where our sense of our 
selves and others shifts from context to context (Davies and Harré, 1990; 
Wetherell, 2005a) is a problem for any essentialising approach: variability and 
flexibility would escape account there. 
 What is being suggested here is that the critique of discursive psychology 
is almost entirely fair, in that individual differences are not yet adequately 
explained in discursive theory. There is indeed an issue here, of the need to 
theorise a connection between the sayer and the said. But, the argument here, is 
that while that connection to the personal is needed, a psychoanalytic 
framework may not be the only, or best, way to deliver this. Instead, it may be 
that a discursive psychology which looks beyond the micro to encompass the 
macro and the historical can offer a rich theorisation of a reflexive, acting, 





discursively constituted individual (Wetherell, 1998; 2003; forthcoming, 
2007). 
 So, the approach adopted for this study follows an ontological 
constructionism, a synthesised micro and macro account, a discursive 
psychology which makes space for the subject. 
 There are many well established theoretical and conceptual routes into this 
discursive reading of the subject. These include of course interpretative 
repertoires (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edley, 2001), the sayings and themes 
that are repeated in our patterns of speech, that give us a sense of the 
frameworks for ‘thinking’. Also, notions of dilemmatic thinking, the conflicts 
and therefore the rhetorical choices to be made in accounts (Billig et al., 1988; 
Billig, 1991). In addition, Billig’s work on discursive repression (Billig, 1999c) 
is useful in any exploration of a discursive psycho-social because it points to 
what language represses rather than to some internalised mechanism of the 
unconscious. 
 Conversation analysis of course provides a set of tools, in its elaboration of 
patterns in talk such as repairs, refusals, preferred and dispreferred responses 
etc. (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998). These are the approaches of the 
epistemological discursive psychology, agnostic as to experience. 
Nevertheless, these resources can take us further. There is material here to 
inform our understanding of participant subjectivity; these patterns all imply 
tellings that matter to participants in particular ways. Consider, for example, 
Potter’s notion of stake, the interest speakers have in the way words reflect 
back on themselves (Potter, 1996). Consider this alongside Davies and Harré 
(1990) on positioning, our ways of representing ourselves or others as certain 
sorts of people. Stake inoculation statements, such as ‘some of my best friend 
are…’, tell us something not just about discursive positioning, but also the 
subjectivity of the participant in regard to those sorts of positionings. This is 
not to claim that the practice of stake inoculation inevitably provides a 
transparent window to subjectivity, but it does provide us with a recognisable 
resource for thinking about a reflexive and a dialogic internal world. 
 A crucial point though, is that this reflexive dialogic world is steeped and 
shaped in intersectional histories, that is, in the configuration of different social 
groupings, such as ethnicity, class, or gender, etc. across time as well as in the 
moment (Phoenix and Frosh, 2001; Wetherell, 2005a). This lived life history 
provides us with an alternative route into thinking about commitments to 
particular discourses without invoking essential internal mechanisms. My own 
project on women and accounts of success and failure is in its infancy and I am 
not yet in a position to make claims about what a discursive approach to 
constructions of ‘successes and failures’ shows us about different subjects and 
subjectivities. But, I envisage an argument that ‘success’, or ‘failure’, such as 
Louisa’s ‘failure’ in taking sick leave, has particular meaning when it is 
embedded in lived life history, aligned with certain sorts of social values and 




certain sorts of moral orders; moral orders formed and reproduced in our 
discursive practices, evident in the struggles to negotiate meaning, in the way 
particular positions are negotiated in our language in use, in our institutions 
and our technologies (Billig et al., 1988; Rose, 1996; 1999; Skeggs, 1997). 
 These macro discourses draw on Foucauldian notions of disciplinary 
practices and power relations (1976), and to Bakhtinian concepts of 
internalised heteroglossia, that quality of language which makes it a site of 
struggle (op. cit.). Also, this macroanalytic examination can call on Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus (Bourdieu, 1992) relevant here because of its interest in 
theorising the internalisation of social relations (Noble and Watkins, 2003). 
 What I am trying to show here is what rich fields these are for discursive 
psychologists (see Billig, 1996; 1999c; Wetherell, 2003; 2005a; forthcoming, 
2007; Wetherell and Edley, 1999). They provide enormous resources for 
understanding what discourses may be available; for showing how and where 
and why they may be employed; for what sorts of subjects are produced and 
what sort of subjectivities. Through attention to micro and macro social orders 
and contexts, this synthesized discursive psychology can also begin to account 





The argument has been this: a viable and productive analytic route is needed to 
understand human behaviour, and to use that understanding to bring about 
emancipatory change. Such a route might sensibly follow a properly psycho- 
and properly -social approach to understanding subjects and subjectivities. This 
needs to be one that does not inadvertently maintain a psycho, social, divide; 
nor one that essentialises or fixes the person; nor one that loses sight of the 
person. A discursive psychology with a broad gaze offers an analytic route that 











I want to acknowledge the generous help and support of my PhD supervisors, 
Prof. Margaret Wetherell and Prof. Ann Phoenix in commenting on this paper: 





Billig, M. (1991) Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology, 
London, Sage. 
Billig, M. (1996) Arguing and thinking: a rhetorical approach to social 
psychology, second edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press and 
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme. 
Billig, M. (1999a) ‘Whose Terms? Whose ordinariness? Rhetoric and ideology 
in conversation analysis’, Discourse and Society, 10(4), 543-558. 
Billig, M. (1999b) ‘Conversation analysis and the claims of naivety’, 
Discourse and Society, 10(4), 572-576. 
Billig. M. (1999c) Freudian Repression: Conversation creating the 
unconscious, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D., and Radley, A. 
(1988) Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking, 
London, Sage. 
Bourdieu, P. (1992) The Logic of Practice, Cambridge, Polity. 
Davies, B. and Harré, R. (1990) ‘Positioning: the discursive production of 
selves’, Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, 20, 43-65. 
Edley, N. (2001) ‘Analysing masculinity: Interpretative repertoires, ideological 
dilemmas and subject positions’, in M. Wetherell, S.J. Taylor and S.J. 
Yates (eds) Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis, London, Sage. 
Edwards, D. and Potter, J. (1992) Discursive Psychology, London, Sage. 
Edwards, D. (1997) Discourse and Cognition, London, Sage. 
Edwards, D. (2006) ‘Discourse, cognition and social practices: the rich surface 
of language and social interaction’, in Discourse Studies, 8(1), 41-49. 
Foucault, M. (1976) The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge 
(trans. 1978 Robert Hurley), London, Penguin Books. 
Frosh, S. (1999) ‘What is outside discourse?’ Psychoanalytic Studies, 1 (4), 
381-390. 
Gergen, K.J. (1999) An Invitation to Social Construction, London, Sage. 
Hall, S. (ed) (1997) Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practices, London, Sage/The Open University. 
Henriques, J., Hollway, W., Urwin, C., Venn, C. and Walkerdine, V. (1984) 
Changing the subject: psychology, social regulation and subjectivity, 
London, Routledge. 




Hollway, W. (1984) ‘Gender difference and the production of subjectivity’, in 
J. Henriques, W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn and V. Walkerdine (eds) 
Changing the Subject, London, Methuen. 
Hollway, W. and Jefferson, T. (2000) Doing qualitative research differently: 
Free association, narrative and the interview method, London, Sage. 
Hollway, W. and Jefferson, T. (2005) But why did Vince get sick? A reply to 
Spears and Wetherell, British Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 175-180. 
Hutchby, I. and Wooffitt, R. (1998) Conversation Analysis: Principles, 
Practices and Applications, Oxford, Polity Press. 
Linehan, C. and McCarthy, J. (2000) Positioning in practice: understanding 
participation in the social world, Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 30(4), 435-453. 
Maybin, J. (2001) ‘Language, Struggle and Voice’, in M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, 
and S.J. Yates (eds.) Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader, London, 
Sage/The Open University. 
Morson, G.S. and Emerson, C. (1990) Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a prosaics, 
 Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
Pappenheim, H. (2006) ‘Introductory Commentary’, International Forum of 
Psychoanalysis, 15, 67-69. 
Phoenix, A. and Frosh, S. (2001) ‘Positioned by ‘hegemonic’ masculinities: a 
study of London boys’ narratives of identity’, Australian Psychologist, 36, 
(1). 
Potter, J. (1996) Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social 
Construction, London, Sage. 
Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond 
Attitudes and Behaviour, London, Sage. 
Rose, N. (1996) Inventing our selves: psychology, power and personhood, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Rose, N. (1999) Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self, 2nd 
edition, London, Free Association Press. 
Skeggs, B. (1997) Formations of Class and Gender, London, Sage. 
Spears, R. (2005) Where did Vincent’s van go? British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 44, 165-168. 
Van Dijk, T. (1993) ‘Principles of critical discourse analysis’, in M. Wetherell, 
S. Taylor, and S.J. Yates (eds.), Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader, 
London, Sage/The Open University. 
Wetherell, M. (1998) ‘Positioning and interpretative repertoires: conversation 
analysis and post-structuralism in dialogue’, Discourse and Society, 9(3), 
387-412. 
Wetherell, M. (2003) ‘Paranoia, ambivalence and discursive practices: 
Concepts of position and positioning in psychoanalysis and discursive 
psychology’, in R. Harre and F. Moghaddam (eds.), The Self and Others: 





Positioning Individuals and Groups in Personal, Political and Cultural 
Contexts, New York, Praeger/Greenwood Publishers. 
Wetherell, M. (2005a) ‘Methods for Studying Intersectional and Multiple 
Identities: Troubled and Untroubled Subject Positions and the Macro/Meso 
and Micro’, Paper presented at the ESRC Seminar Series, Methods in 
Dialogue, Cambridge, May, 2005. 
Wetherell, M. (2005b) Unconscious conflict or everyday accountability? 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 169-173. 
Wetherell, M. (forthcoming, 2007) ‘A Step Too Far?: Discursive Psychology, 
Linguistic Ethnography and Questions of Identity’, Journal of 
Sociolinguistics Special Issue on Linguistic Ethnography. 
Wetherell, M. and Edley, N. (1999) ‘Negotiating hegemonic masculinity: 
Imaginary positions and psycho-discursive practices’, Feminism and 
Psychology, 9, 335-356. 
Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. and Yates, S.J. (eds.) (2001a) Discourse Theory and 
Practice: A Reader, London, Sage/The Open University. 
Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. and Yates, S.J. (eds.) (2001b) Discourse as Data: A 
guide for Analysis, London, Sage/The Open University. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
